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Abstract 
We examine the link between issuer reputation and mortgage-backed security (MBS) performance using 
a sample of 4,247 European MBS issued between 1999 and 2007. We measure performance with credit 
rating downgrades and delinquencies and track their changes over the long term. We find that, overall, 
MBS sold by reputable issuers are collateralised by higher quality asset pools which have lower 
delinquency rates and are less likely to be downgraded. However, as credit standards declined during 
the boom period of 2005-2007, asset pools securitized by reputable issuers were of worse quality 
compared to those securitized by less reputable issuers. Therefore, reputation as a self-disciplining 
mechanism failed to incentivise the production of high quality securities during the credit boom.  
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Non-technical summary 
The literature on securitization primarily addresses the failings of the US markets while the European 
markets have received very little academic research attention. To this end, this paper focuses on 
European mortgage backed securities (MBS) issued prior to the 2007-09 financial crisis and examines 
the performance of these securities considering the reputation of the originator. 
The certification value of reputation in the financial services industry has been widely documented in 
finance theory. In the securitization literature, however, the role of reputation has been scantly 
considered and findings are inconclusive. We, therefore, consider the role of issuer reputation in the 
subsequent performance of MBS. More importantly, we emphasise the nature of this relationship during 
credit booms. We argue that reputation can function as a self-disciplining device so that issuers should, 
in principle, sell on high quality assets to protect their reputation, as the issuance of subpar quality assets 
can adversely affect investors’ perceptions of future issuances.  
We use a large dataset of 4,247 European MBS issued between 1999 and 2007. We model the 
relationship between tranche level performance and reputation with a logistic regression where 
performance is a binary variable indicating whether a tranche was ever downgraded by the cut-off. 
Subsequently, we model the deal level performance using a standard industry metric, annual 90-day 
delinquency rates. 
Our main findings are twofold. First, securitizations from reputable issuers generally tend to be backed 
by higher quality collateral at origination. Yet, during the credit boom (2005-07) the quality of collateral 
originated by these issuers was of worse quality than that issued by less reputable issuers. Second, the 
results suggest that issuances from reputable sponsors are less likely to be downgraded, despite the 
decline in collateral quality.  
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1. Introduction
Modern securitization has grown significantly since the 1980s and has transformed the process of 
financial intermediation. However, it has come under scrutiny due to being a major contributing factor 
to the 2007-2009 financial crisis (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). Issuers, or originating 
banks, and credit rating agencies were criticised for failing to meet expected standards. Issuers relaxed 
lending criteria for securitized mortgages (Keys et al., 2009; Keys et al., 2012; Jiang et al., 2013; Kara 
et al., 2016) and rating agencies underestimated the risk (Coval et al., 2009; Brennan et al., 
2009; Richardson and White, 2009). Consequently, investors in mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) 
suffered significant losses during the crisis. Although they were also blamed for being overly reliant on 
credit ratings (Mählmann, 2012), investors have attempted to incorporate the potential costs of 
misaligned interests at the pricing stage of MBSs beyond the informative content of ratings by 
accounting for issuer size, the rating bias, creditor protection, collateral, and tranche structure (Fabozzi 
and Vink, 2012a, b, 2015; He et al., 2012).  
Investors may have also relied on issuer’s reputation. Reputation has a certification value in the financial 
services industry (Booth and Smith, 1986; Titman and Trueman, 1986; Fang, 2005) and may be an 
important indicator for investors. In securitization, issuers’ reputation is tied to the quality of the 
collateral pool; therefore, they should be motivated to ensure the quality of the collateral backing the 
securities. In theory, the risk of losing long run reputation should motivate issuers to avoid 
misrepresentations in contractual disclosures, mitigate opportunistic behaviour and moral hazard to 
produce high-quality securities in the interest of investors (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). 
Securitization is also wealth-creating for shareholders of reputable issuers and this value stems from the 
perceived comparative advantage of reputable issuers in credit origination and servicing (Thomas, 
1999). Therefore, there is an incentive for issuers to protect their reputation.  
Empirical evidence on issuer reputation in MBS quality is ambiguous and mainly based on United States 
(US) markets. For example, Winton and Yerramilli (2015) argues that reputable issuers are more likely 
to continue monitoring the loan pool even during credit booms, when monitoring is difficult to maintain, 
and therefore provide better quality MBS. On the contrary, Griffin et al. (2014) find that for complex 
securities, such as MBS, reputable underwriters may issue securities that underperform during 
downturns. However, He et al. (2016) report inconclusive results.   
In this paper, we examine the predictive ability of issuer reputation on future MBS quality and whether 
reputation operates as a self-disciplining mechanism in the European MBS markets. Ideally, reputation 
concerns should mitigate opportunistic behaviour by the issuer. Thus, assuming issuers intend to access 
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the market over the long term, the loss of reputation should act as an incentive to ensure that issuers 
securitize relatively high quality assets.  We measure quality using two indicators: credit rating 
transitions (downgrades) of the tranches and underlying loan pool delinquency rates. Issuer reputation 
is measured by market volume of the issuer. We use a large dataset of 4,247 European commercial and 
residential MBS issued between 1999 and 2007. 
We contribute to the literature on issuer reputation and MBS performance by providing evidence from 
the European market. The European market has received considerably less research attention on post 
securitization performance even though it is the second largest market after the US market. These 
markets are also considerably different in their historical development. Firstly, the remarkable expansion 
of the US securitization markets has been attributed to the influence of the Government Sponsored 
Enterprises (GSEs). However, there is limited government participation in the European market.1 
Secondly, the growth of the US securitization market has been progressive and continuous since the late 
1960s. In contrast, the European securitization market grew rapidly and exponentially in the 2000s after 
the introduction of the euro and increased demand from institutional investors (Altunbas et al., 2009).2 
Given these differences, investors in Europe may have relied more on issuer reputation for mitigating 
MBS risks. 
It is important to unearth the dynamics of the European securitization markets. Since 2008, the primary 
and secondary market for securitization instruments in the euro area has collapsed and European policy 
makers, recognizing the potential benefits of securitization to the financial system, are considering 
policy options to transform and revive securitization markets in the European Union. In particular, the 
STS (Simple, Transparent, and Standardised) approach is a priority for current work on creating a 
Capital Market Union (Constâncio, 2016). A healthy European securitization market is indicative of a 
functioning capital market in the European Union. In this respect, our research contributes to the 
discussion on the importance of issuer behaviour in maintaining the quality standards of asset backed 
securities and making these instruments attractive to investors. 
1 The development of European securitization had been limited by the variable and absence of legal and regulatory frameworks 
in many European countries (Baums, 1994; Hayre, 1999). From the demand side, the dearth of analytical tools and suitable 
information infrastructure to support the efficient information transmission to market participants limited the viability of 
securitization. Also, the lack of mortgage contract standardisation across countries and exchange rate risks somewhat limited 
the appeal of cross-border transactions (Hayre, 1999) . 
2 Outstanding volumes climbed by about 1,400% from $139 billion in 1999 to $2 trillion in 2007. 
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We find that issuers’ reputational capital generated from the frequency of MBS issuance predicts future 
performance. Reputable issuers issued MBS collateralised by high quality asset pools with lower 
delinquency rates. However, as credit standards declined during the boom period, the asset pools 
securitized by reputable issuers were of worse quality compared to those securitized by less reputable 
issuers. We attribute this decline in quality to increased issuer complacency and reduced monitoring 
efforts. Our results also show that MBS sold by reputable issuers were less likely to be downgraded by 
the rating agencies, probably due to the compensating effects of structuring techniques.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a background to the 
securitization process and reviews the extant literature. Section 3 describes the data followed by the 
methodology used in Section 4. Results are presented in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.  
2. Background and Related Literature
2.1. The securitization process 
Securitization involves the transformation of illiquid assets such as mortgages into relatively marketable 
securities. Securitization starts with the extension of credit such as mortgages. These mortgages are 
pooled and conveyed to a special purpose vehicle, an entity set up for the sole purpose of this transaction. 
With the help of an underwriter, typically an investment bank, the asset pool is structured into various 
tranches, which are then rated by credit rating agencies. Credit rating agencies evaluate the credit risk 
of these tranches based on either expected losses or probability of default. Finally, the rated tranches are 
sold as MBS securities to investors.  
It is well established that banks are comparatively efficient loan originators. They have a relative 
advantage at screening and monitoring borrowers hence securitization creates an avenue for banks to 
specialise and profit from these tasks while reaping diversification gains by shifting risks to capital 
market participants who are better suited to absorb these risks (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987; Pavel and 
Phillis, 1987). Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988) argue that originators’ portfolios grow concentrated over 
time as they tend to operate in areas where they are able to manage and absorb expected losses. Hence, 
securitization serves as an avenue to shed the catastrophe risk within their portfolios. Furthermore, 
securitization is a more efficient approach to risk management. This efficiency is achieved by stripping 
and partitioning credit and prepayment risks, which in turn enhances risk sharing (Greenbaum and 
Thakor, 1987; Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988). 
Securitization may also be used as an alternative source of capital to traditional debt and equity funding 
(Gorman, 1987; Farruggio and Uhde, 2015). Although, multiple empirical studies show that securing 
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funding was the primary motivation for asset securitization in Europe3, Jones (2000) highlights the 
central role of securitization in engineering regulatory capital arbitrage.  Using securitization, banks can 
reduce their effective risk-based capital requirements significantly, without a commensurate reduction 
in economic risks. For example, under Basel I, unsecured loans were not risk adjusted hence banks had 
to hold the same level of capital for AAA and BBB rated corporate loans of the same value. Therefore, 
it was costlier to hold safer loans on the balance sheet. Securitization under this regime allowed banks 
to concentrate a large portion of the default risk in the equity tranche, which is then retained while selling 
the higher quality tranches. Thus, according to the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis, banks will securitize 
safer assets while keeping riskier ones as banks perceived the capital requirements on safer assets to be 
excessive. Although a few studies (Berndt and Gupta, 2009; Krainer and Laderman, 2013; Elul, 2015) 
show that portfolio loans were safer than securitized loans, several studies report converse findings 
where securitized assets were safer than portfolio loans (Ambrose et al., 2005; Agarwal et al., 
2012; Albertazzi et al., 2015; Benmelech et al., 2012; Shivdasani and Wang, 2011; Cebenoyan and 
Strahan, 2004). 
2.2. The impact of investor demand 
The demand for MBSs climbed in the years leading to the financial crisis as these tranches offered higher 
yields4, attracted lower capital charges and were often used as collateral. In addition, MBSs are offered 
in a wide range of maturities to meet various investment horizons (BlackRock, 2004).  The strong 
demand for highly rated securities during the growth period prior to the financial crisis created an 
incentive for broker/dealers to harness developments in financial engineering to create more of these 
highly rated securities from low quality loans (Segoviano et al., 2015). 
Investor demand for MBSs also soared due to rating-dependent regulation. Credit ratings were of prime 
importance in determining minimum capital requirements for financial institutions such as banks and 
insurance companies. National regulations also restrict pension funds from investing in non-investment 
grade bonds.5 This central role of ratings spurred the institutional demand for highly rated bonds such 
as MBSs as the supply of highly rated single-name securities was quite limited (Benmelech and Dlugosz, 
2009). Consequently, adverse selection problems emerged as issuers relaxed their lending standards to 
3 Martín-Oliver and Saurina (2007) and Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010) for Spanish banks; Affinito and Tagliaferri (2010) for 
Italian banks; Hänsel and Bannier (2008) for banks based in 17 European countries. 
4 Relative to single-name securities of comparable quality, MBSs offer higher yields to compensate investors for the variable 
maturity and payment characteristics of these bonds. MBSs tend to make monthly income payments as opposed to conventional 
fixed income securities that make semi-annual payments. 
5 Bonds rated BBB (Baa3) or higher by Standard & Poor's/Fitch (Moody's). 
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cater for this increase in demand. This is evident in the increased delinquencies recorded in the US 
subprime mortgage sector during the financial crisis (Keys et al., 2010; Nadauld and Sherlund, 
2013; Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011)  
This breakdown in the securitization machine can be attributed to misaligned incentives and imperfect 
information. Information loss occurs as securitization extends the distance between originators and the 
ultimate investors. Consequently, certain borrower characteristics observed by lenders are not 
transmitted to the final investor. There is an incentive for the bank to extend loans that rate highly on 
characteristics that affect its fee income, those characteristics observable by investors (hard 
information), despite the possibility that these loans are risky according to unreported dimensions (soft 
information). Thus, securitization limits or removes the incentive to collect soft information (Rajan et 
al., 2015) and to perform their screening and monitoring function efficiently.  
2.3. Reputation as a self-disciplining mechanism 
The bankruptcy-remoteness feature of these transactions, as well as the fact that investors do not observe 
the quality of the collateralised mortgages, limits the incentive to carefully screen the mortgagors, 
thereby creating the first inefficiency –adverse selection. Furthermore, the second inefficiency is the 
moral hazard problem where there is a limited incentive to continuing monitoring the securitized loans 
(Geithner and Summers, 2009; Keys et al., 2010; Kara et al., 2018). Securitization advocates argue that 
reputation is a sufficient self-disciplining mechanism. Therefore, the tendency of securitizing high 
quality assets can also be explained by the reputation hypothesis. Since the placement of securitization 
follows a repeated game structure, the potential loss of reputation creates an incentive for issuing banks 
to maintain or improve their credit quality standards to ensure encouraging levels of subscription and 
continual market access. Consequently, securitized loans should be safer than portfolio loans (Ambrose 
et al., 2005).  
The value of reputation as a disciplining mechanism is supported in various standard finance theories 
(Booth and Smith, 1986; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). Hartman-Glaser et al. (2012) analyse a 
repeated security issuance game with reputation concerns. They find that there can be opportunistic 
issuers that are initially honest when reputation is low, but subsequently go on to build a reputation only 
to be exploited in the future by misreporting collateral quality.  Similarly, Kawai (2015) show that the 
reputation incentive can actually worsen the moral hazard problem.6 
6 Buiter (2008) also criticised Alan Greenspan’s tenure at the Fed as failing to recognise the weaknesses associated with 
reputation as a self-disciplining mechanism in markets characterised by short horizons and easy exits. 
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On the empirical front, using a sample of CLO, MBS, ABS, and CDOs worth $10.1 trillion, Griffin et 
al. (2014) find that for complex securities, reputable underwriters may issue securities that underperform 
during downturns. They show that the common intuition regarding the role of reputation in maintaining 
issuer discipline can break down with complex securities. In standard reputation models, investors can 
assess the quality of simple assets in good and bad states. In their model, securities are complicated such 
that investors are unable to evaluate the performance of the securities in a hypothetical economic state. 
Therefore, investors only become aware of asset values in a bad economic state only when this state 
occurs. This creates an incentive for reputable banks to issue poor quality securities. This explains the 
tendency for opportunistic reputable underwriters to increase issuance volumes prior to an economic 
downturn. In fact, Piskorski et al. (2015) and Griffin and Maturana (2016) show that misreporting by 
originators and underwriters was quite common in private label mortgage backed securitization. 
Furthermore, misreporting was a strong predictor of losses while issuance yields were not. This indicates 
that investors were unaware of these misreporting tendencies. However, it is not clear from this research 
whether reputable issuers were relatively more culpable. 
In this paper, we extend the work of Griffin et al. (2014), which focuses on underwriters using the 
activity levels of these underwriter banks in the IPO market to measure reputation in the fixed income 
market. Our focus is on the issuer as they are responsible for asset (mortgage or loan) origination. We 
argue that holding the intricacies of structuring constant, high quality MBSs are created from high 
quality mortgages. Hence issuers who wish to retain favourable access to the securitization markets over 
the long term are more likely to securitize their high quality assets. 
Winton and Yerramilli (2015) argue that reputable issuers are more likely to continue performing their 
monitoring function during periods of increased competition while less reputable institutions tend to 
increase market share at the expense of monitoring existing obligors. They show that investors are 
generally willing to receive lower spreads on tranches issued by reputable banks. However, He et al. 
(2012) find that investors demanded higher spreads on securities issued by reputable issuers in the few 
years prior to the financial crisis. They attribute this finding to investors’ concern about the questionable 
relationship between issuers and rating agencies, where large issuers are better positioned to secure 
inflated ratings. 
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3. Data and Variables
3.1. Data 
Our sample comprises 4,247 residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities issued in 12 
European countries7 from 1999 to the first half of 2007. This cut-off date is chosen to circumvent 
changing investor attitude as investors’ appetite for asset-backed securities began declining in June 
2007. Originators have largely retained post-2007 European issuances. According to data published by 
SIFMA, issuing banks were able to place only 36% of all issuances between July and December of 2007. 
Thus, investors were no longer buying these tranches hence issuing banks mainly use new issues as 
collateral for European Central Bank repo transactions. As of 2017, the UK and Dutch issues account 
for most placed issues throughout Europe. 
We combine data from multiple sources. First, we collect rating transition data from Bloomberg to 
construct our primary MBS performance variable – Downgrade. We identify tranches that were 
downgraded by at least one of the three largest credit ratings agencies –Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s 
and Fitch– between the issuance date and 2011, as more than half the tranches in our sample are paid 
off by that date. We construct Downgrade as a dummy variable where all downgrades take the value of 
1 and 0 otherwise. This variable allows us to test our hypotheses on individual tranches within deals 
thereby increasing the number of observations available for analysis. Although the ratings of all three 
agencies are forward-looking, ratings issued by Moody’s measure expected losses contingent on default 
while ratings issued by Standard & Poor’s and Fitch are indicators of the probability of the securities 
defaulting. A prime weakness of this measure is that credit ratings are not reviewed as frequently as 
delinquency rates are reported. Also, credit ratings can be supported by structural features thereby 
weakening the link between the performance of the underlying assets and rating changes.  
Second, we focus on the industry standard metric of the performance of loan portfolios –delinquencies. 
In this regard, we collect data on the delinquency rates of the underlying asset pools covering the first 
four years after issuance. Due to the sparseness of pool delinquency data prior to 2002, only 50% of the 
deals in the sample end up in our regressions.  
Third, we collect initial tranche and deal-level data as well as the identity of the issuing bank from 
Dealogic and Bloomberg. Tranches in our sample are either floating rate or fixed rate tranches issued in 
the Euromarkets. We restrict our sample to floating rate tranches only to circumvent the difficulties 
7 United Kingdom, Spain, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, France, Greece, Sweden, Belgium, and Switzerland. 
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associated with estimating a consistent benchmark yield curve for each fixed rate tranche. For the 
floating rate notes, we use the quoted spreads in excess of the relevant benchmark (3mLibor/3m-
Euribor) as a measure of funding cost. These spreads represent extra compensation for credit, liquidity 
and optionality risks. However, the optionality risk in the price for floating rate tranches is marginal 
(Fabozzi and Vink, 2015). Therefore, the initial spreads reflect the risk premiums compensating for 
liquidity risk and credit risk. Rather than assuming that all securities are issued at par, we restrict our 
sample to tranches issued at par to preclude distortions of discounts or premiums on the actual yield 
spreads. This results in a final sample of 4,247 tranches from 733 mortgage-backed deals. 
Finally, in an attempt to substantiate our results, we collect bank-level data from Bankscope (now Orbis 
Bank Focus) to control for the influence of bank characteristics on the performance of the mortgage-
backed securities in our sample. The dependent and explanatory variables used in our empirical models 
and analyses are explained in Table 1 and in the following sub-sections.  
3.2. Dependent Variables 
We measure MBS performance using credit rating downgrades and delinquency rates as proxies of 
tranche and deal (pool) performance respectively. 
3.2.1. Rating Downgrades 
Although recent evidence (Fabozzi and Vink, 2012a, b, 2015; He et al., 2012) indicates that investors 
incorporated a variety of factors into pricing asset backed securities, credit ratings are the single most 
important determinant of tranche prices at origination. Structured finance credit ratings are forward-
looking credit opinions that account for credit risks of the underlying assets, structural risks and 
counterparty risks.  
We assume that ratings account for delinquency rates. However, structural features can be engineered 
to stave off rating downgrades. For instance, high levels of credit protection can result in the 
maintenance or upgrade of an existing credit rating. Therefore, credit ratings measure the performance 
of the underlying assets as well as structural features. Given that no organised secondary market for 
MBS exists, pricing data is very scant. Therefore, we rely on credit rating downgrades as a measure of 
deterioration in at least one or more of these dimensions.  
We collect credit ratings at issuance and rating changes of all tranches from issuance until 2011. 
Subsequently, we convert the ratings to a numerical point scale, where AAA/Aaa=1, AA+/Aa1=2 and 
so on. Thus, Downgrade is defined as a negative migration to a lower rating for instance from AAA to 
AA+. Downgrades are typically triggered by adverse changes in credit risk, counterparty risk or 
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structural risk associated with how the deal was engineered. Following Adelino (2009), we model 
Downgrade as a binary variable where 1 represents downward rating adjustments relative to the rating 
awarded at issuance while 0 represents upgrades or maintained ratings. Therefore, this variable 
represents tranches that suffered at least one downgrade by any of the rating agencies.  
3.2.2. Delinquencies 
We identify non-performing deals based on the proportion of loan pools that are 90+ days delinquent. 
We do not observe actual defaults in our dataset, however, we rely on delinquency rates as a measure of 
severely underperforming loans (Avery et al., 1996). A loan is delinquent when an obligor fails to make 
a scheduled payment. As the payments are typically made in monthly intervals, lenders typically classify 
delinquent loans into 30, 60, 90, or more days delinquent relative to the duration that the earliest missed 
payment has been overdue. The delinquency rate is simply the ratio of the number of loans with 
delinquent payments to the total number of loans within the asset pool. 
Delinquency rates are customarily used as measures of performance in the lending industry as the 
definition of default varies significantly.8 This metric has also been increasingly used as a measure of 
performance in academic research.9 Furthermore, the Basel Committee classifies obligations beyond 90 
days overdue as unlikely to be repaid (BCBS, 2002). Also, we focus on 90+ delinquencies (serious 
delinquencies), as loans in this category are more likely to default. Although not all delinquent loans 
eventually default, Keys et al. (2010) show that approximately 66% of loans that are 90 days delinquent 
tend to default within the next 12 months. Similarly, Tracy and Wright (2016)show that mortgages 
entering the 90+ delinquency bucket have a reasonably low cure rate10 of approximately 23.3%. 
Furthermore, 90% of 90 day+ delinquent subprime loans usually transition to foreclosure (Keys et al., 
2008).  
SIFMA also issued a standard default assumption for analysing mortgage defaults where mortgage 
default rates peaks between 30 and 60 months after origination (Hu, 2011). Using historical data, Soyer 
and Xu (2010) find that mortgage default rates tend to peak between 40 and 50 months after origination. 
Securitization deals are typically closed within three to twelve months, and issuers are usually required 
to replace mortgage loans that are delinquent within a specified warranty period after the deal closes. 
8 Experian (2014) defines default as payments that are at least six months overdue while Equifax (2016) only considers a loan 
to be in default if payments are more than 60 days overdue. 
9 See Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011); Keys et al. (2010); Keys et al. (2012); Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) 
10 The cure rate refers to the percentage of delinquent loans that are either repaid or brought current by making missed payments. 
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However, we do not have data on seasoning of the loan pool. Therefore, we are unable to ascertain the 
exact stage in the life cycle of the loans within the pool.  
To circumvent this limitation, we plot the delinquency data over the first four years, presented in Figure 
1. We find that the highest point of the distribution tends to occur within the third and fourth year.
Delinquency rates are highest in the third (fourth) year for 2 (3) out of 5 vintages. For this reason, we 
focus more on the delinquency rates in the third and fourth year as our dependent variables. Initially, we 
compute the average delinquency rates in the third and fourth year after issuance. Subsequently, as 
suggested by Guettler et al. (2011), we compute the average delinquency rates over the first three and 
four years to obtain a summary measure that captures the delinquencies within the initial years as well. 
Although our 36-48 month range is rather crude, it falls within the 30-60 month and 40-50 month bands 
indicated above. 
3.3. Independent Variables 
3.3.1. Reputation 
Frequent securitizers tend to build a reputation, and hence they can issue MBS at relatively lower costs. 
It is also argued that reputable issuers are more likely to continue performing their monitoring function 
during periods of increased competition while less reputable institutions tend to increase market share 
at the expense of monitoring existing obligors (Winton and Yerramilli, 2015). Therefore, we expect that 
tranches issued by reputable market players to outperform those issued by their rivals who securitize 
less frequently.   
The reputation variable – Top Issuer – is computed based on the market share of the issuing banks. 
Market share or market share-based measures have been widely used in the existing literature as 
empirical proxies for reputation.11 Following the intuition in Fang (2005), we use a binary variable to 
capture the qualitative difference between large and small issuers. Top Issuer is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the issuer features in the list top 10 issuers by market volume, and 0 otherwise. 
There are 12 issuers satisfying this criterion, and they jointly represent 33.78% of issuance levels (see 
Table 2, Panel A). 12  
11 See  Megginson and Weiss (1991); Beatty and Welch (1996); Fang (2005); Guettler et al. (2011) 
12 There are 12 issuers on this list because the bottom 3 issuers had the same market share over the aggregate period. 
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3.3.2. Credit Ratings 
We incorporate two credit rating variables in our regressions – Credit Rating and 3 CRA Reported. 
Firstly, the securitization pricing literature overwhelmingly concurs that credit ratings explain 
substantial variation in initial yields. For instance, Fabozzi and Vink (2012a) find that credit ratings 
explain 74% of the variation in the yields of UK RMBS. Other papers find similar evidence (Fabozzi 
and Vink, 2012b; Cuchra, 2005). This is expected since MBS are typically structured by underwriters, 
in consultation with rating agencies, to achieve a specific rating. All deals in our sample are rated by at 
least one of the three well-renowned credit rating agencies – Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch.13 
Dealogic reports a composite credit rating that combines the credit ratings from different rating agencies 
for each tranche. The use of composite credit ratings is quite common in the corporate bond literature 
(Campbell and Taksler, 2003) as well as the securitization literature (Fabozzi and Vink, 2015; Cuchra, 
2005). We map the composite ratings onto a numerical scale where AAA=1, AA+=2 and AA=3 and so 
on, in order to compute the summary statistics for this variable. However, we only include an indicator 
for each rating in all our regressions. Furthermore, we categorise the AAA-rated tranches as prime and 
tranches with other ratings as non-prime in the latter aspect of our analyses (See Table 2, Panel B).  
Rating shopping, where issuers solicit ratings from multiple agencies and then only reporting the 
favourable ratings or ratings from agencies with lenient standards, was common practice in the 
securitization industry (Adelson, 2006). Sangiorgi and Spatt (2016) theoretically show that investors 
adjust prices to account for potential rating bias when issuers report fewer ratings than the number of 
ratings available to the issuer. Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that single rated deals tend to 
suffer more severe adverse credit migrations relative to deals with multiple ratings (Benmelech and 
Dlugosz, 2010). He et al. (2016) also find that cumulative losses are higher on solely rated MBS deals 
compared to deals with multi-rated deals. Although rating shopping is beyond the remit of our paper, 
given the evidence of its influence on tranche performance, we control for this phenomenon using a 
dummy variable 3 CRA. This variable takes the value of 1 where a tranche is rated by all three agencies 
(less likelihood of rating shopping) and 0 otherwise (See Table 2, Panel C for the distribution of the 
number of ratings).  
Additionally, Fabozzi and Vink (2012b) provide empirical evidence indicating that investors consider a 
number of credit factors when pricing European ABS deals. These credit factors include credit 
enhancement, collateral, and country of origination. We explain these below. 
13 Based on turnover in 2014, S&P, Moody’s and Fitch controlled 91.89% of the credit ratings sector in the EU (ESMA, 2015). 
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3.3.3. Credit Enhancement 
The most popular form of credit enhancement in securitization is subordination. Consequently, this 
variable features as a standard control variable in the securitization literature (He et al., 2016; Fabozzi 
and Vink, 2012b; He et al., 2012). Subordination is exemplified in the waterfall structure (senior-
subordinate) of cash flow/loss distribution. Under a waterfall structure, the priority of cash flow 
distribution follows a descending order of seniority while losses are allocated from the bottom-up (from 
the equity tranche to the senior-most tranche). For each tranche, the subordination level is computed as 
the value of tranches in the same deal that have an equal or higher rating than the given tranche as a 
fraction of the total deal value. Although this variable is our main measure of deal structure, it also 
represents the level of protection offered by lower tranches in each deal. 
Furthermore, we control for tranche retention in our regressions. Gorton and Pennacchi (1989); Gorton 
and Pennacchi (1995) show that securitization (loan sales) decreases banks’ screening and monitoring 
incentives; however, this misalignment of incentives can be addressed by the issuer retaining some 
exposure to the issue. Retained tranches are essentially credit enhancement devices to shield investors 
from the effects of the originator's perverse incentives (Franke et al., 2012). Our dataset does not 
explicitly indicate which tranches are retained; however, deal notes state whether at least one tranche 
was retained in the deal. We account for retention by constructing Retained as a binary variable 
indicating deals in which certain tranches of the deal were retained by the originator.  
3.3.4. Collateral 
Securitization instruments are usually classified by collateral. Our sample contains tranches backed by 
two distinct types of collateral: residential and commercial mortgages (See Table 2, Panel B). CMBSs 
are significantly different from RMBSs. CMBSs are business loans secured against commercial real 
estate while RMBSs are retail loans. When rating RMBS, agencies pay more attention to underwriting 
standards and historical loss data. However, the focus of agencies when rating CMBS is the income 
earning potential of the property. Also, prepayment risk has been historically lower for CMBS due to 
the covenants stipulating lock-in periods and prepayment penalties (Kothari, 2006). We introduce 
Collateral as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for RMBS and 0 for CMBS.  
Concerning collateral quality, Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011) finds that combined loan-to-value 
ratio is one of the most important determinants of loan performance. Consequently, we use the weighted 
average loan to value ratio at origination (WALTV) as a measure of borrower leverage to account for 
credit risk that credit ratings fail to capture. Loan-to-value (LTV) represents loan value as a percentage 
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of the value of the collateral backing the said loan. WALTV is calculated as the average, weighted 
according to the loan amount, of the LTV of each loan in the pool.  
3.3.5. Country of origination 
Drawing on the information based theories of banking (Berger et al., 2008; Detragiache et al., 
2008; Mian, 2006; Stein, 2002), where foreign banks encounter difficulties in evaluating opaque local 
borrowers, we also control for issuer being a foreign bank. We construct Distance, a binary variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the nationality of the issuer's parent differs from the country of the issuer's 
operations, and 0 otherwise.14 Table 3 presents the sample distribution according to the country of 
origination. Tranches backed by mortgages originated in the UK account for more than half of our 
sample. Other significantly active countries include Spain, Netherlands, Germany and Portugal account 
for approximately 38% of our sample.    
3.3.6. Complexity 
We control for credit ratings in all our specifications. However, Opp et al. (2013) and Furfine (2014) 
show that increased deal complexity may result in rating inflation. Furfine (2014) further shows that 
complexity proxied by the number of tranches is correlated with poor loan performance. Therefore, we 
initially account for deal complexity using the number of tranches per deal. Furthermore, we find that 
most deals contain multiple tranches with identical ratings but with different issue currency and 
weighted average life. In practice, it has been suggested that these additional tranches are usually created 
to meet the needs of a broad range of investors (Cuchra and Jenkinson, 2005). However, both variables 
are highly collinear, consequently, we create a refined measure of complexity as the ratio of the number 
of uniquely rated tranches to the total number of tranches in a deal – Ratings/Tranches. 
3.3.7. Other deal and tranche characteristics 
We account for tranche size using principal values (also used as a measure of complexity in Furfine, 
2014) and control for interest rate risk exposure using the Weighted Average Life of each tranche. Based 
on prepayment speed assumptions, the weighted average life of a tranche is computed as the weighted 
average time that each monetary unit of principal remains outstanding. The weighted average life 
accounts for prepayment risk and will always be shorter than the nominal maturity of the underlying 
mortgages.  
14 We define issuers to including institutions that originated the collateral backing a given securitization transaction, rather than 
the special purpose vehicle establish to fulfil the transaction. 
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We also utilise the variable Boom, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the relevant tranche was issued 
between 2005 and 2007, and 0 otherwise. This variable is used to proxy for the exponential growth 
period in European securitization markets. Additionally, we control for year of issuance (Year). 
In our robustness tests, we control for common bank characteristics to ensure that our findings are not 
driven by time-varying underlying issuer characteristics. These include size (Total Assets), asset 
diversification (Net Loans/Total Assets), funding diversification (Deposits/Total Assets), leverage 
(Equity/Total Assets), Loan Growth and asset quality (Loan Loss Reserves/Gross Loans).  
4. Empirical Models
4.1. Issuer Reputation 
Following Adelson and Bartlett (2005) and Adelino (2009), the first set of models employ credit rating 
migrations (Downgrade) as the dependent variable and the independent variables include, issuer 
reputation (Top Issuer), rating shopping (3 CRA), weighted average loan to value (WALTV) and other 
control variables. The baseline logistic regression model is specified as follows: 
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑜𝑝𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽23𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑊𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑖 + 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  𝜀  (1)
In subsequent iterations of this model, we use the interaction of TopIssuer with Boom to determine 
whether reputable issuers sold relatively poor quality securities during the growth period. We interact 
TopIssuer with 3 CRA  to ascertain whether tranches with 3 ratings issued by reputable issuers were 
riskier. Finally, we interact TopIssuer with AAA-rated tranches to assess the performance of highly rated 
tranches issued by reputable issuers.  
Using Downgrade as our dependent variable inherently assumes that downgrades represent deterioration 
in underlying asset quality. However, rating changes may reflect changes in the structural integrity of 
the deal as well as changes in the quality of the underlying asset pool. To relax this assumption, we use 
90+ day delinquency rates to measure pool quality. Consequently, we specify another, but similar model 
to Equation 1 based on deal level variables only. This is because delinquency rates reflect pool wide 
performance and are not tranche specific. This model is as follows: 
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑜𝑝𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑗 + 𝛽23𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑊𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑗 + 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  𝜀 (2)
Subsequently, we run models controlling for bank-level characteristics to test the reliability of our 
inferences. We assume that unobservable factors that might affect both dependent and independent 
variables simultaneously are time invariant. Thus, we introduce entity fixed effects to exploit within-
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group variation over time and control for unobserved heterogeneity, and time fixed effects to control for 
market conditions and macroeconomic trends associated with the relevant issuance years. All 
regressions are estimated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the issuer level to 
control for heteroskedasticity and control for correlation between deals from the same issuer.  
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 presents the summary statistics of our sample at the deal, tranche and bank levels. The deal and 
tranche level variables are described below. 
4.2.1. Deal Level Variables 
For the deal level analysis, we use default frequencies (delinquency rates) as our dependent variables. 
These variables represent the proportions of the collateral pool that are at least 90 days delinquent. We 
use the average delinquency rate in the third and fourth years of issuance as measures of pool 
performance. Furthermore, we use the average delinquency rates over the 3 and 4-year period after 
issuance to capture pool performance in the earlier years. The mean delinquency rate in the third year 
of issuance is 5.26% compared to a 3-year average delinquency rate of 3.31% for 432 deals. Similarly, 
the mean delinquency rate in the fourth year stood at 5.71% in the fourth year compared to a 3.72% 4-
year average delinquency rate on 465 deals. This trend indicates that delinquency rates must have been 
much lower in the first two years of issuance. It is also worth noting that the distribution of the default 
frequencies is quite uneven: the median delinquency rates range from 0.72% to 1.19% while the mean 
ranges from 3.31% to 5.71%.  
Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011) find that combined loan-to-value ratio is one of the most important 
determinants of loan performance. Consequently, we use the weighted average loan to value ratio at 
origination (WALTV) as a measure of risk embedded in the underlying loans. The mean (median) 
WALTV of our sample is 71.39% (71.92%). The typical deal is worth €1.190 billion and contains at 
least 6 tranches with 3 distinct rating classes resulting in an average complexity measure (Number of 
ratings/Number of tranches) of 75.33%.  
4.2.2. Tranche Level Variables 
The mean yield spread is 66.45 basis points (bps) over the whole sample with a standard deviation of 
91.67 bps. Weighted average life, proxies the interest rate risk associated with a tranche. Due to the 
propensity of obligors to prepay their mortgages, nominal maturity is a less reliable measure of the term 
of MBSs. Based on prepayment speed assumptions, the weighted average life is computed as the 
weighted average time until each monetary unit of principal is repaid. Hence, the weighted average life 
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will always be shorter than the nominal maturity of the underlying mortgages. The mean (median) 
weighted average life of the sample is 5.44 years (5.10 years). The average principal of tranches in our 
sample equals €224m, and the average credit rating of 4.73 corresponds to Aa3 (AA-) on the Moody’s 
(S&P/Fitch) scale. 
5. Regression Results
5.1. Results with Downgrades 
Table 5 presents the results of the logistic regression on the full sample. We regress Downgrade on 
issuer reputation (TopIssuer), tranche and deal characteristics, and other control variables. Consistent 
with our expectations, TopIssuer is negative and highly statistically significant in all regressions, 
indicating that tranches issued by frequent issuers are less likely to be downgraded. 3 CRA is not 
statistically significant in any of our regressions, thereby indicating that even if ratings were shopped, 
this had no bearing on the probability of a downgrade.  
In columns 2 to 5, we interact TopIssuer with Boom, 3CRA, Distance and AAA respectively. 
TopIssuer#Boom and TopIssuer#3CRA Reported are not significant at any of the conventional levels. 
Therefore, issuances from frequent issuers during the boom were no different from deals issued by less 
reputable institutions. Similarly, the interaction of TopIssuer and 3CRA in column 3 is of no significance 
in determining the likelihood of a downgrade.  
In column 5, we introduce TopIssuer#AAA into the baseline model to ascertain the extent to which the 
highest quality ratings on tranches issued by reputable issuers are revised downwards. This interaction 
is statistically insignificant. In column 6, our prominent findings remain consistent when we include all 
the interactions in the baseline model, and TopIssuer#AAA is now significant at the 10% level. AAA 
rated tranches sponsored by reputable issuers are generally less likely to face deterioration in quality.  
We replicate the regression model in column 6 while controlling for the sponsoring banks’ 
characteristics, the results of which are reported in Table 6. We control for size (Total Assets) in all the 
regressions, asset concentration (Net Loans/Total Assets) in column 1, diversification of funding sources 
(Deposits/Total Assets) in column 2, leverage (Tier 1 Ratio) in column 3, Loan Growth in column 4, 
Loan Loss Reserves/Gross Loans in column 5. Column 6 controls for all bank characteristics 
simultaneously.  
Similar to the findings highlighted above, TopIssuer is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level in columns 1 to 4. However, this variable loses its significance after controlling for the loan loss 
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reserve ratio in columns 5 and 6. TopIssuer#Boom remains negative but is now statistically significant 
at the 5% (1%) level in columns 1-5 (column 6) indicating that issuance by reputable players during the 
growth period were less likely to be downgraded. Once more, TopIssuer#3 CRA is not significant in any 
of our models and also TopIssuer#AAA is no longer significant after controlling for bank-level 
characteristics. 
In Table 5, we find that WALTV is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level suggesting that 
tranches collateralised by mortgages with high LTV ratios (lower borrower equity) are more likely to 
deteriorate in quality. This is not surprising as high LTV mortgages are generally considered to be riskier 
and hence attract higher interest rates. Ratings/Tranches is negative and statistically significant at the 
10% level. However, this significance is lost upon controlling for loan loss reserves in column 5 and all 
the bank characteristics simultaneously in column 6. Therefore, it would seem that complex deals tend 
to retain their original ratings. The ratings of different agencies tend to converge for simple securities. 
Ratings typically differ significantly on relatively complex securities thereby creating an incentive to 
shop for ratings (Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009). However, our findings suggest that complex and opaque 
deals are less likely to suffer downgrades. This may be because of the efficacy of the structural 
component of complex deals. These deals usually feature high-level engineering to tailor cash flows to 
a diverse range of investors. This resulting complexity stands in sharp contrast to structuring designed 
to confuse investors. Weighted Average Life (LogWAL) has a positive coefficient and remains 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, long-term tranches are more likely to be downgraded as 
tranches with longer maturities, or less prepayment risk are statistically more likely to be effected with 
an increased risk that the tranches will not fully pay down by their final maturity dates. We also find 
that Distance is positive but weakly significant, showing that tranches sold by foreign issuers performed 
worse than those issued by domestic issuers. We interact Distance with TopIssuer, and find that it is 
positive and significant at the 5% level. It seems bonds issued by reputable foreign issuers are more 
likely to be downgraded. Consistent with Vrensen (2006), as CMBS tend to be more complicated and 
riskier, we find that RMBSs are still less likely to be downgraded even after controlling for bank 
characteristics individually and collectively in Table 6. We are agnostic regarding the influence of bank 
level characteristics on tranche performance as the focus of our paper is the importance of higher-level 
variables such as reputation and functional distance. 
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5.2. Results with Delinquencies 
In Table 7, we regress delinquency rates in the third (column 1) and fourth years (column 2) of issuance, 
as well as 3-year (column 3) and 4-year (column 4) average delinquency rates, on issuer reputation and 
deal level characteristics. We use these time periods as delinquencies tend to be highest in these years.15 
The regression results consistently indicate that deals sponsored by reputable issuers (TopIssuer) 
perform better – indicated by lower ex-post delinquency rates. TopIssuer#Boom has a positive sign and 
is statistically significant. Therefore, although issuances by reputable (frequent) banks are usually of 
higher quality in normal periods, the delinquency rates on issuances during the growth years were higher 
than less reputable securitizers. One interpretation is that during the boom period when general asset 
quality declined, larger issuers securitized comparatively poorer quality assets. Alternatively, the 
delinquency rates could have increased as a result of decreased monitoring effort. However, this is 
inconsistent with Winton and Yerramilli (2015) who argue that reputable issuers are more likely to 
continue performing their monitoring function during periods of increased competition while less 
reputable institutions tend to increase market share at the expense of monitoring existing obligors. Thus, 
although the quality of issuances from reputable issuers declined during the boom period, these 
issuances were less likely to be downgraded. This could be because of strong structural features that 
compensate for declines in underlying asset quality. 
3 CRA is still not significant, furthermore, TopIssuer#3 CRA is not significant in any of the models while 
Deal Size variable is negative and statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels in columns 1 to 3 
and 4 respectively. This indicates that larger deals generally performed much better. Certainly, it is 
reasonable to assume that larger deals are more diversified thereby driving delinquency rates 
downwards. Also, deals collateralised by residential mortgages tend to suffer higher defaults. However, 
it is worth noting that CMBS only make up 15-19% of the various samples used in the regressions.  We 
also find that Distance is positive but marginally significant.  
Subsequently, we run the same set of regressions while controlling for all the bank characteristics 
simultaneously. The results are presented in Table 8. TopIssuer remains negative, but this variable is 
only statistically significant at the 10% level in column 3 where the dependent variable is the 3-year 
average delinquency rate. Once more, 3 CRA remains an insignificant.  
15 Similar to our analysis above, we also include time and entity fixed effects to control for the influence of aggregate trends 
and unobserved heterogeneity respectively. 
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Regarding the interactions, TopIssuer#Boom remains positive and is now statistically significant at the 
1% level. Thus, reputable issuers generally issued higher quality deals however during the lending 
boom, they issued tranches collateralised by subpar asset pools. Moreover, the extent of this 
deterioration is significant at the 99% confidence level. TopIssuer#3CRA is now negative but still 
insignificant, and Deal Size remains negative but is only statistically significant in columns 3 and 4. 
Our findings show that the delinquency rates of loan pools securitized by reputable issuers increased 
during the boom period. Therefore, it would be plausible to expect that the relevant tranches will suffer 
relatively more severe downgrades. However, we show that these tranches did not suffer more severe 
downgrades. This may be due to the tranches’ structural features which may have compensated for 
increasing delinquency rates. 
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we test whether reputation functions as a self-disciplining mechanism in the MBS market 
and reputable issuers provide higher quality MBS. We find that issuers’ reputational capital generated 
from the frequency of MBS issuance predicts future performance. Reputable issuers issued MBS 
collateralised by high quality asset pools with lower delinquency rates. However, we find that during 
the boom period, as credit standards declined, the asset pools securitized by reputable issuers were of 
worse quality compared to those securitized by less reputable issuers. We conjecture that this may have 
occurred because of decreased monitoring efforts. 
Our results also show that issuances by reputable sponsors were less likely to be downgraded by the 
rating agencies. This finding could be because of the efficacy of structuring techniques in compensating 
for the declining credit quality of the underlying assets. Overall, our findings are consistent with 
conventional wisdom regarding the tendency of reputable banks to create high quality securities. 
Reputable issuers tend to offer higher quality securities, even from low quality assets pools.  
Our conclusions are relevant from a policy perspective. On the backdrop of several post-crisis proposals, 
the European lawmakers reached an agreement with national governments to revive the European 
securitization markets. This deal sets out criteria for simple, transparent and standardised securitization 
(STS), and represents a cornerstone of the drive to establish a capital markets union. It is expected that 
these criteria in conjunction with the reform of the credit rating industry should make the pricing process 
more efficient. Furthermore, as the market is re-established, it would be interesting to see further 
dialogue on the role of reputation, and information asymmetry in the post-crisis issuance. 
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Table 1 Definitions of variables and sources of data 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent Variables 
Downgrade 
Downgrade is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the relevant 
tranche was ever downgraded by any of the rating agencies from 
issuance up to 2011 
Bloomberg 
90+ Day Delinquency (3rd Year) The average 90+ day delinquency rate (%) in the third year of 
issuance 
Bloomberg 
90+ Day Delinquency (4th Year) The average 90+ day delinquency rate (%) in the fourth year of 
issuance. An increasing rate indicates deterioration in asset quality 
Bloomberg 
90+ Day Delinquency (3 Year 
Average) 
The average 90+ day delinquency rate (%) over the first three years of 
issuance 
Bloomberg 
90+ Day Delinquency (4 Year 
Average) 
The average 90+ day delinquency rate (%) over the first four years of 
issuance. This variable captures variations in the earlier years of 
issuance. 
Bloomberg 
Deal Level Variables 
TopIssuer 
Top Issuer is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the issuer 
is within the top 10 issuers based on volume, and 0 otherwise. There 
are 12 issuers on this list as the bottom 3 issuers had the same market 
share over the aggregate period. These issuers individually accounted 
for more than 2% in terms of total market volume during this period. 
Jointly, they account for 33.78% of the market activity 
Authors' calculation 
3 CRA 
The number of initial ratings reported by credit rating agencies/issuer 
for a tranche. This variable is constructed as a binary variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the relevant tranche is rated by 3 agencies and 0 
otherwise. We use this variable to control for rating shopping. 
Bloomberg 
Weighted Average Loan to Value 
(WALTV) 
Weighted average loan to value (WALTV) measures the quality of a 
pool of mortgages; where loan to value (LTV) is the ratio of the 
mortgage loan to the value of the real estate. Hence, high LTV ratios 
correspond to lower equity. WALTV is computed as the average of 
the loan-to-value ratios of all the loans within the pool, weighted by 
the respective loan amount relative to the value of the asset pool. 
Bloomberg 
Number of tranches Number of tranches per deal Dealogic/Bloomberg 
Number of ratings Number of distinct ratings within a deal Bloomberg 
Ratings/tranches 
The ratio of the number of distinct ratings to the number of tranches. 
We use this variable as a measure of complexity such that deals with 
more rating classes for given number of tranches are considered to be 
more opaque and riskier 
Authors' calculation 
Deal Size The value of the total deal in €millions Dealogic 
Retained This is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when at least one 
tranche is retained as per the notes accompanying each transaction 
Dealogic 
Tranche Level Variables 
Tranche Size The value of the tranche deal in €millions Dealogic 
Spread The quoted margin (in basis points) in excess of the relevant 
benchmark. This spread measures the compensation required by 
Dealogic 
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Variable Description Source 
investors for the risk borne. It is expected that this margin still has 
predictive value even after conditioning on credit ratings 
LogSpread The natural logarithm of the quoted margin; to correct a positive 
skew in the distribution of the Spread 
Authors' calculation 
Year 
The year of deal issuance, ranging from 1999-2007. We expect that 
the general quality of the issuances declined throughout the growth 
period 
Dealogic 
Boom This is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the relevant bond was issued 
between 2005 and 2007, and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation 
Distance This is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 the nationality of the 
issuer's parent differs from the country of the issuer's operations 
Authors' calculation 
Collateral This is a factor variable indicating whether a deal is backed by either 
residential or commercial mortgages 
Dealogic 
Weighted Average Life The effective maturity of the relevant tranche subject to prepayment 
speed assumptions. 
Bloomberg 
Credit rating 
The reported credit ratings are mapped onto an ordinal numerical 
scale where AAA=1, AA+=2 and so on. These are used as indicator 
variables within the regressions, and the numeric values are of no 
significance.  
Dealogic/Bloomberg 
Bank Characteristics 
Total Assets Total assets is used as a proxy for bank size and scale of operations 
Orbis Bank Focus 
(previously Bankscope) 
Net Loans/ Total Assets 
This variable measures diversification of the asset base. More 
specifically, it measures the proportion of total assets made up of 
loans. A higher ratio may indicate low liquidity 
Orbis Bank Focus 
(previously Bankscope) 
Deposits/Total Assets As a measure of funding diversification, this ratio measures what 
fraction of assets are funded by deposits 
Orbis Bank Focus 
(previously Bankscope) 
Equity/Total Assets Leverage - The ratio of total equity to total assets. 
Orbis Bank Focus 
(previously Bankscope) 
Loan Growth Annual percentage change in the value of gross loans 
Orbis Bank Focus 
(previously Bankscope) 
Loan Loss Reserves/Gross Loans The ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans issued 
Orbis Bank Focus 
(previously Bankscope) 
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   Figure 1 Distribution of delinquency rates 
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Table 2 Sample characteristics 
Panel A: Top issuing banks (Number of deals) 
Issuing Banks Percentage 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 4.90% 
Ally Financial Inc. 4.39% 
Morgan Stanley 3.37% 
Barclays Bank Plc 2.96% 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc 2.76% 
NRAM PLC 2.55% 
Kensington Group Plc 2.35% 
Credit Suisse AG 2.24% 
Commerzbank AG 2.14% 
Banco Santander SA 2.04% 
Deutsche Bank AG 2.04% 
HBOS Plc 2.04% 
33.78% 
Panel B: Tranche distribution by rating categories and underlying collateral 
Collateral Prime Non-Prime Total 
Commercial mortgages 257  643          900 
Residential mortgages 1,326 2,021       3,347 
Total 1,583 2,664       4,247 
Percentage 37% 63% 100% 
Panel C: Tranche distribution by Number of Ratings Secured 
No. of Ratings CMBS RMBS Total 
1 55 206          261 
2 581 1,205       1,786 
3 264 1,936       2,200 
Total 900 3,347       4,247 
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   Table 3 Country of origination 
CMBS RMBS Total Percentage 
United Kingdom 451 1885 2336 55.00% 
Spain 6 568 574 13.52% 
Netherlands 9 369 378 8.90% 
Germany 189 152 341 8.03% 
Italy 45 279 324 7.63% 
Portugal 80 80 1.88% 
Ireland 4 70 74 1.74% 
France 44 19 63 1.48% 
Greece 25 25 0.59% 
Sweden 7 14 21 0.49% 
Belgium 18 18 0.42% 
Switzerland 1 1 2 0.05% 
756 3491 4247 100.00% 
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